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LONG LIVE THE COMMON LAW OF COPYRIGHT!: 
GEORGIA V. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC. AND THE 
DEBATE OVER JUDICIAL ROLE IN COPYRIGHT 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh* 
In Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., the Supreme Court 
resurrected a nineteenth-century copyright doctrine—the government 
edicts doctrine—and applied it to statutory annotations prepared by a 
legislative agency. While the substance of the decision has serious impli-
cations for due process and the rule of law, the Court’s treatment of the 
doctrine recognized an invigorated role for courts in the development of 
copyright law through the use of principled reasoning. In expounding 
the doctrine, the Court announced a vision for the judicial role in copy-
right adjudication that is at odds with the dominant approach under the 
Copyright Act of 1976, which sees courts as limited to interpreting and 
deferring to the text of the statute. This Piece unpacks the longstanding 
debate about judicial role in copyright that manifested itself rather vividly 
in the majority and dissenting opinions in the case. In the process, it 
shows how Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court consciously 
unraveled a delicate—but undesirable—institutional balance that has 
come to be accepted within the world of copyright law, and imagines the 
consequences that it might have for the future of copyright adjudication 
and lawmaking. 
INTRODUCTION 
In its much-anticipated decision in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. 
(PRO), a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the modern 
significance of copyright’s ancient “government edicts” doctrine, which 
denies copyright protection to official texts created under the authority of 
law.1 In identifying the animating principle underlying the doctrine as the 
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 1. 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1503–04 (2020). Even prior to oral argument, the case received a 
significant amount of press coverage and publicity, in recognition of the substantive issue at 
stake. See, e.g., Editorial, The Law©?, N.Y. Times (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2019/06/25/opinion/copyright-law.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Adina 
Solomon, Can States Copyright Annotations to Their Own Laws?, U.S. News & World Rep. 
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idea that “no one can own the law” as its author,2 the Court proceeded to 
apply the doctrine to the annotations in the official Code of Georgia on 
the logic that they were prepared by an agency that was an arm of the 
legislature and thus executing its legislative duties.3 
The outcome in the case undoubtedly represents a major victory for 
advocates of public access to laws, who see in such access a basic commit-
ment to democratic ideals and the rule of law. All the same, the decision 
is worthy of close attention not just because of its significance for the pub-
lic availability of laws. As this Piece argues, the Court’s decision represents 
something of a crucial turning point in the complex structure of copyright 
lawmaking and adjudication. 
In holding that the government edicts doctrine fully applied to the 
annotations involved, the Court validated a rule that had been created, 
developed, and extended entirely by nineteenth-century courts in parallel 
with the basic statutory framework of copyright law. The doctrine is thus 
unequivocally a common law doctrine, in the sense of originating and 
remaining outside the terms of the statute.4 Yet unlike other copyright 
doctrines of common law vintage that the Court has weighed in on,5 the 
government edicts doctrine has remained wholly untouched by the statute, 
expressly and implicitly, thereby rendering itself immune to the complex-
ities (and contradictions) of the statute’s policy objectives. This has in turn 
required courts to expound a foundation for the continuing legitimacy of 
the doctrine rooted entirely in copyright’s first principles, without 
recourse to an actual or imputed legislative intent. And therein lies the 
central structural contribution of the majority opinion in PRO: reaffirm-
ing a role for courts in developing copyright rules incrementally, despite 
the dominance of the statute. 
Indeed, it is this attribute of the government edicts doctrine and its 
evolution that explains the peculiar alliances and divisions that character-
ized the Court’s opinions in the case.6 Both the majority opinion as well as 
                                                                                                                           
(Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2019-08-22/can-states 
-copyright-annotations-to-their-own-laws (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 2. PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1507. 
 3. Id. at 1508–09. 
 4. The doctrine finds no mention in the text of the current statute, or indeed in the 
legislative history accompanying the enactment of the 1976 Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–122 
(2018); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976). 
 5. Examples of such common law doctrines that find implicit recognition in the 
statute include the fair use doctrine and indirect infringement. The former is codified in 
Section 107, and the latter implicitly recognized in Section 106. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–107. 
 6. The majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts was joined by Justices 
Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, and the principal dissent authored by Justice 
Thomas was joined by Justices Alito and Breyer. PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1503. Justice Breyer did 
not sign on to Part II-A of the principal dissent, the portion of the dissent dealing directly 
with judicial role. Id. at 1513 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Perhaps this might explain why Justice 
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the principal dissent were each joined by a combination of conservative 
textualists and liberal purposivists that cut across traditional political 
lines.7 Indeed, as has since come to be revealed, one or more Justices 
switched their votes on the case after the opinions were circulated.8 Nei-
ther political ideology nor interpretive methodology can account for the 
alliances, which are instead best explained by divergent visions of judge-
made law in the copyright system. 
To the Justices in the minority (led by Justice Thomas), validating the 
government edicts doctrine was a dangerous undertaking insofar as it 
risked undermining the ideal of legislative supremacy in copyright law and 
thereby recasting the “judicial role.”9 In this view, courts have a purely 
interpretive role in the copyright system, lest they introduce “noxious 
weeds” into the statutory scheme by extrapolating from precedent to 
develop common law rules for copyright.10 Extreme as it may seem, this 
view has dominated modern copyright thinking in the United States for 
some time now.11 On the other hand, the majority saw its validation of the 
doctrine as altogether unproblematic, and a mere reaffirmation of what 
courts—reasoning from precedent—have always done, within copyright 
and beyond.12 In this vision, which the majority portrays with some degree 
of sanguinity as utterly conventional within copyright law, precedent forms 
a powerful nonstatutory constraint on courts when accompanied by a 
discernible rationale.13 
                                                                                                                           
Breyer also signed Justice Ginsburg’s substantive dissent. Id. at 1522 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 7. The only exception to this is Justice Ginsburg, who chose not to join Justice 
Thomas’s dissent, but instead authored a separate dissent in the case limiting herself to a 
different interpretation of the government edicts doctrine. Id. at 1522–24. Notably, this 
dissent was joined by Justice Breyer, who has been on opposite sides from Justice Ginsburg 
on several significant copyright issues to come before the Court. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 523–54 (2013) (Breyer, J.); id. at 557–87 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 306–36 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.); id. at 344–67 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192–222 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.); id. 
at 242–67 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 8. See Joan Biskupic, Behind Closed Doors During One of John Roberts’ Most 
Surprising Years on the Supreme Court, CNN (July 27, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/
07/27/politics/john-roberts-supreme-court-liberals-daca-second-amendment/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/EVV4-CBNU] (describing how Chief Justice Roberts was able to convert 
his initially dissenting opinion into the majority in the case). 
 9. PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1515 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017) 
(“We thus begin and end our inquiry with the text . . . .”). For an overview from a prominent 
federal judge, lamenting the mistrust of courts that is implicit in the working of the current 
copyright system, see Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 1049, 1056 
(2001). 
 12. See PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1507–08. 
 13. Id. at 1510. 
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Recognizing the legitimacy of an extratextual body of copyright law 
that is governed by a set of foundational principles has implications that 
extend well beyond government edicts. It opens up the possibility of 
greater judicial involvement in crafting the rules of copyright and focuses 
courts’ attention on the identification and elaboration of copyright prin-
ciples toward this end. The conflict between principle and policy in 
American copyright thinking has long been a contentious one; it is 
currently in a state of détente that favors the latter.14 Chief Justice 
Roberts’s majority opinion in PRO—and its direct response to the 
dissent15—seems to portend the possibility of this balance ending and 
courts doing more than just interpreting the text of the statute. This Piece 
attempts to unpack and imagine these possibilities. 
Part I provides an overview of the substance underlying the majority 
opinion in PRO, describing the doctrinal issues involved. Part II shows how 
the substantive reasoning of the Court only partially captures the broader 
issue that the Justices disagreed on, namely, the appropriate judicial role 
in copyright cases. The government edicts doctrine became a perfect 
vehicle for this debate, which engaged the balance between legislative 
policy and principle-based reasoning within the copyright system. Part III 
then imagines what a new institutional equilibrium—seemingly endorsed 
by the majority—might look like within copyright thinking. 
I. THE OBVIOUS PART OF PRO 
At issue in PRO was the copyrightability of the annotations contained 
in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (OCGA). Despite containing 
annotations, the OCGA is Georgia’s official code and produced under the 
authority of the state.16 It contains the official text of the Georgia code, 
which has the force of law, as well as annotations of a nonbinding nature 
including “summaries of judicial decisions applying a given provision, 
summaries of any pertinent opinions of the state attorney general, and a 
list of related law review articles and similar reference materials.”17 
While these annotations do not carry the force of law on their own, 
they are produced through a somewhat unique process. The annotations 
are produced by a branch of the state legislature, designated as the Code 
                                                                                                                           
 14. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright as Legal Process: The Transfor-
mation of American Copyright Law, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1101 (2020) (tracking the develop-
ment of U.S. copyright law and arguing that the modern regime is best conceived of as a 
legal process). 
 15. See PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1512 n.4 (responding to the dissent’s comments on the 
judicial role). 
 16. Id. at 1504. 
 17. Id. 
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Revision Commission (CRC), and empowered under the state’s constitu-
tion.18 The CRC in turn delegates the production of the individual 
annotations to a private entity—LexisNexis—under a “work made for 
hire” arrangement, which gives the CRC both authorship and ownership 
of the annotations.19 The CRC supervises the specifics of the production 
of the annotations, which it then approves and presents to the state legis-
lature.20 Each year, the legislature in turn votes in a legislative session to 
“merge” the annotations with the actual provisions of the code to produce 
the OCGA.21 Perhaps most importantly, the OCGA is the only official code 
of the state—i.e., there is no unannotated official code.22 
PRO, the defendant in the case, is a nonprofit organization commit-
ted to ensuring the public availability of all laws and government 
materials.23 In pursuance of its goals, PRO posted a complete version of 
the OCGA on its website for the public to access and download freely, and 
it did so without obtaining permission from Georgia.24 In the first instance, 
the district court found for the plaintiff, concluding that the OCGA was 
indeed copyrightable.25 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
applying a somewhat convoluted theory of authorship by the people, 
which it read into the government edicts doctrine.26 The Court then 
granted certiorari, which both parties had favored in the interest of greater 
clarity.27 
The government edicts doctrine, which was at the heart of the case, is 
itself a creation of the Court dating back to the late-nineteenth century. In 
three cases from that period, the Court had framed, developed, and 
applied the doctrine, without ever visiting or mentioning it again in the 
130 years since. In accepting the case, the Court was therefore agreeing to 
revisit and interpret its own jurisprudence from that era. 
The first of these cases was pre–Civil War: Wheaton v. Peters.28 The case 
is famous among copyright scholars for having concluded that there was 
no independent common law copyright in the United States for published 
                                                                                                                           
 18. Id.; see also Ga. Code Ann. § 28-9-2 (2020) (setting up the CRC and empowering 
it with distinct functions relating to the production of the OCGA). 
 19. PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1505; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (definition of a “work made 
for hire”); id. § 201(b) (determining authorship and ownership of a work made for hire). 
 20. See Ga. Code Ann. § 28-9-5; PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1505–06. 
 21. Ga. Code Ann. § 1-1-1. 
 22. Id. 
 23. PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1505. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 
1356 (N.D. Ga. 2017). 
 26. See Code Revision Comm’n ex rel. Gen. Assembly of Ga. v. Public.Resource.Org, 
Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 27. Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (granting certiorari). 
 28. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
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works after the enactment of the 1790 Copyright Act.29 All the same, since 
the case involved a dispute between two of the Court’s own officially 
appointed reporters, the opinion concluded with the categorical observa-
tion that “no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written 
opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges thereof cannot confer 
on any reporter any such right.”30 
This somewhat cryptic observation in Wheaton became the subject of 
two subsequent Court decisions—both from the year 1888 and authored 
by the same judge, Justice Samuel Blatchford. A lesser-known Supreme 
Court Justice from New York, Blatchford had been a prominent private 
attorney before being elevated to the bench.31 During that time, however, 
he also served as the official court reporter for federal courts in New York 
and up until 1888 maintained and published an independent report of 
Second Circuit decisions.32 In this latter capacity, he was therefore 
intimately familiar with the practices of court reporters, which formed the 
basis of the two 1888 decisions that he authored. 
In Banks v. Manchester, the first of these decisions, the Court 
considered the copyrightability of reports prepared by the court reporter 
to the Supreme Court of Ohio, who had been appointed under an Ohio 
statute and mandated to “secure a copyright” in the published reports by 
the terms of the statute.33 In holding that no part of the report was 
copyrightable, the Court relied on Wheaton to conclude: 
The question is one of public policy, and there has always been 
a judicial consensus . . . that no copyright could under the statutes 
passed by Congress, be secured in the products of the labor done 
by judicial officers in the discharge of their judicial duties. The 
whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposi-
tion and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, 
                                                                                                                           
 29. See, e.g., Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: 
Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 Wayne L. Rev. 1119, 1178 (1983) 
(“Wheaton v. Peters . . . established that copyright in the United States is strictly a statutory 
creation, without foundation in common law.”); Craig Joyce, A Curious Chapter in the 
History of Judicature: Wheaton v. Peters and the Rest of the Story (of Copyright in the New 
Republic), 42 Hous. L. Rev. 325, 388 (2005) (“We know from the dissents in Wheaton that 
the question of the existence of copyright in Wheaton’s Reports was decided negatively by a 
4-2 vote.”). 
 30. Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 668. 
 31. See A. Oakey Hall, Justice Samuel Blatchford, 5 Green Bag 489, 489 (1893). 
Blatchford went on to become managing partner of the firm founded by his father—Seward 
& Blatchford—which would go on to be called Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. Id.; Our Story, 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, LLP, https://www.cravath.com/our-story/index.html [https://
perma.cc/4HMS-MVMY] (last visited Oct. 31, 2020) (referring to the original founders as 
Blatchford and Seward). 
 32. Hector T. Fenton, Mr. Justice Blatchford. In Memoriam., 41 Am. L. Reg. 882, 882–
83 (1893). 
 33. 128 U.S. 244, 245–47 (1888). 
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is free for publication to all, whether it is a declaration of 
unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or a statute.34 
In Ohio at the time, the judge writing the opinion was also responsible for 
preparing the headnote, syllabus, and statement of the case, all of which 
were thus regarded as uncopyrightable, being the product of judicial 
officers discharging their judicial function.35 
The second of the two decisions, Callaghan v. Myers, was handed down 
by the Court a mere two weeks after Banks.36 While it presented the Court 
with a similar set of facts as in Banks, the state statute at issue was from 
Illinois.37 Illinois, unlike Ohio, had the court reporter prepare all parts of 
the report other than the opinion itself.38 This made a difference to Justice 
Blatchford, who seized on the idea of the report being the “intellectual 
labor” of the reporter—and not the judge—to exempt it from the prohi-
bition formulated in Wheaton and Banks.39 
Wheaton, Banks, and Callaghan were all clear in their formulation of 
the rule; yet, they all individually and collectively failed to articulate a clear 
rationale for it. And while lower courts subsequently extended the rule to 
newer contexts—such as statutes and municipal codes40—they struggled 
to trace the logic of the prohibition back to this trilogy of cases, lacking a 
basis on which to thread them all together other than an amorphous (and 
heavily contested) idea of public policy. It thus fell to the Court in PRO to 
rationalize the rule in applying it to the OCGA, which formed the 
substance of the Court’s opinion. 
In his opinion for the majority in PRO, Chief Justice Roberts found it 
altogether unproblematic to extend the logic of these cases from judges 
to legislative bodies “vested with the authority to make law.”41 Much as 
judges were seen as uncontroversial lawmakers in the nineteenth century’s 
vision of the law, which formed the basis for the trilogy of cases, legislative 
bodies are today seen as vested with lawmaking authority.42 Applying the 
rule developed in those cases—i.e., the government edicts doctrine—to 
                                                                                                                           
 34. Id. at 253. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 128 U.S. 617 (1888). 
 37. See id. at 619–20. 
 38. Id. at 645. 
 39. See id. at 647. 
 40. See, e.g., Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 
437, 440–41 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (applying it to local technical standards); Veeck v. S. Bldg. 
Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (applying it to local 
municipal codes); Bldg. Offs. & Code Adm’rs v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 735 (1st Cir. 
1980) (applying it to the local building codes); Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 138 (6th Cir. 
1898) (extending it to state statutes). 
 41. PRO, 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1504 (2020). 
 42. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 406–
07 (1908) (providing an account of this mindset). 
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the facts at hand then became relatively straightforward: Since the 
annotations at issue were authored by a body that was an arm of the 
legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions, they were rendered 
uncopyrightable under the government edicts doctrine as formulated in 
the nineteenth-century trilogy of cases.43 
To arrive at this conclusion, the majority opinion examined the 
unique structure of the CRC, its sources of funding, its connection to the 
Georgia legislature, and the nature of its statutory duties—all of which it 
found to support the holding that it was an “adjunct” to the state 
legislature.44 The Court’s holding, Chief Justice Roberts argued, would 
now offer a “clear path forward” for applications of the government edicts 
doctrine to statutes and statute-like texts created under the authority of 
the law.45 
As a substantive matter, the majority opinion certainly resolved any 
ambiguity about the applicability of the government edicts doctrine, 
effectively adopting an approach that rendered the doctrine applicable 
whenever a government agency vested with lawmaking authority exercised 
its power, regardless of the precise nature of the text that it was producing. 
For public access advocates, the outcome was a major victory, especially 
given that Georgia’s practice of publishing an official annotated code as 
the sole official code for the state had been adopted by numerous other 
states.46 All the same, the Court’s account of how its substantive holding fit 
within the overall landscape of copyright’s institutional framework, and 
the delicate balances and settlements that have come to be taken for 
granted therein, was anything but a clear path forward. 
II. THE NOT-SO-OBVIOUS DEBATE OVER JUDICIAL ROLE 
A.  The Standoff 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion was premised on an 
extension of the government edicts doctrine as developed in the trio of 
nineteenth-century cases, in the belief that the “same logic” from those 
cases carried over to statutory annotations.47 While it thus relied on a form 
of analogical reasoning, the precise content of that logic was anything but 
                                                                                                                           
 43. PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1504. 
 44. Id. at 1508–09. 
 45. Id. at 1513. 
 46. Brief of the States of Arkansas, Alabama, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, South Dakota & Tennessee as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14–15, 
PRO, 140 S. Ct. 1498 (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4235530 (“Twenty-three States (including 
Georgia), two territories, and the District of Columbia copyright the annotations in their 
official annotated codes . . . . Were those copyrights invalidated, States’ cost of making 
official annotated codes likely would substantially increase. Those codes may even disappear 
altogether.”). 
 47. PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1504. 
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self-evident. For a rule to carry over from one domain to another—
however closely the two domains appear related—the rationale and basis 
for the rule requires explication so as to justify the extension (or 
retrenchment, as the case may be). Perhaps by design or in the pursuit of 
consensus, the majority opinion fell short on this measure. This prompted 
a strongly worded dissent from Justice Thomas, who took serious issue with 
the majority’s very approach to the matter.48 Justice Ginsburg also 
authored a dissent in the case, interpreting the government edicts 
doctrine as limited to actions done by the legislature “in a legislative 
capacity,” which in her view did not cover annotations.49 
To the majority, the primary rationale for the government edicts 
doctrine was to be found in copyright’s commitment to “authorship.”50 
Government actors invested with the authority to make law could not be 
considered to have authored the expression that they produce in such 
capacity. But what exactly is it that renders the origination of legal texts 
insufficient to generate a claim of copyrightable authorship? Here, the 
opinion identified the “animating principle” underlying the doctrine as 
“no one can own the law.”51 On closer scrutiny, however, that principle 
embodies a good degree of circularity and remains indeterminate. Since 
the first owner of a copyright is ordinarily its author, a denial of authorship 
certainly has the result of denying ownership.52 This is very different from 
suggesting that such denial of ownership causes the law to disallow author-
ship of the work, which its identification as a “principle” would suggest. In 
other words, whereas a denial of authorship always results in a denial of 
ownership, a denial of ownership can arise from reasons other than the 
absence of authorship. The statute’s treatment of U.S. government works 
illustrates the point.53 The majority’s observations conflate the two. 
Instead of explicating the connection between authorship and the 
government edicts doctrine, Chief Justice Roberts then went one step 
further later in the opinion and made an additionally powerful suggestion: 
Congress had acquiesced in the independent validity of the principle he 
was relying on. He thus noted that “[a] century of cases [has] rooted the 
government edicts doctrine in the word ‘author,’ and Congress has 
                                                                                                                           
 48. Id. at 1513–14 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 1523 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 1503 (majority opinion). 
 51. Id. at 1507. 
 52. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2018). 
 53. See 17 U.S.C. § 105(a). The statute provides that protection “is not available” for 
a work of the U.S. government, but that the U.S. government “is not precluded from 
receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it.” The statute further defines a “work of 
the United States Government” in terms of its authorship. Id. § 101 (defining a work of the 
U.S. Government based on whether it was “prepared” by a government employee). The U.S. 
government can therefore never be the author of a work (under the “work made for hire” 
doctrine), even though it can be the owner of a work. 
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repeatedly reused that term without abrogating the doctrine. The term 
now carries this settled meaning.”54   
Together with its prior invocation of authorship as the guiding prin-
ciple behind the doctrine, the majority was therefore suggesting three 
things: that (1) the government edicts doctrine was a natural corollary to 
copyright’s notion of authorship; (2) by using the terms “author” and 
“authorship” without retrenching the doctrine, Congress was implicitly 
endorsing its legality and validity as a separate principle; and therefore (3) 
it was for the Court (or courts) to explicate and police the scope and mean-
ing of these terms—as it (or they) had done in the past. Consequence (3) 
was implicit in (1) and (2), and perhaps the most functionally significant 
of the three since it implicated the role of courts in the copyright system. 
In his dissent, Justice Thomas (joined by Justices Alito and Breyer) 
read the majority as doing much more than just applying the doctrine in 
a straightforward manner, and as instead usurping Congress’s role in 
developing copyright rules. The dissent rightly noted that the trio of 
nineteenth-century cases did not themselves suggest a rationale for the 
doctrine, but that the majority had altogether sidestepped the issue 
instead of attempting to offer such a rationale.55 To Justice Thomas, this 
amounted to a “reflexive[]” acceptance of precedent and an “uncritical 
extrapolation” of the doctrine into a new domain, which was altogether 
“inconsistent with the judicial role.”56 
At first glance, these observations may appear to be no more than the 
rhetorical flourishes of a strongly worded dissenting opinion. Yet, within 
the copyright landscape they represent more—especially the reference to 
judicial role. In the dissent’s view, the problem with the majority’s 
argument was not just that it was relying on the principle of authorship for 
its reasoning, but that it was doing so to override the statute’s express 
policy rationales (e.g., fair notice, incentives) that can be traced to specific 
provisions in the text.57 Without offering a meaning or explication for 
authorship and presuming that Congress had entirely delegated its 
development to the judiciary, the majority was seen to be opening up an 
avenue of copyright reasoning that could undermine the primacy of the 
statute. This risked reallocating institutional power within the copyright 
landscape, where—according to the dissent—“judges [we]re bound to 
respect” the choices of legislative bodies, however unfortunate those 
                                                                                                                           
 54. PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1510. 
 55. Id. at 1515 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority is nonetheless content to accept 
these precedents reflexively, without examining the origin or validity of the rule they 
announced.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1518. 
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choices may be.58 The dissent thus ended with the observation that the 
majority was “stray[ing] from its proper role” of deferring to Congress.59 
Whether or not the dissent’s vision of judicial role in copyright is 
normatively desirable, its concern that the majority opinion was effecting 
a change in that role—however subtly—was accurate. To appreciate the 
nature and significance of that change requires unpacking the delicate 
balance between different modalities of reasoning and lawmaking that the 
U.S. copyright system has come to embody over the course of the last half-
century. 
B.  Unraveling Copyright’s Institutional Balance 
1. Congress over Courts. — Anglo-American copyright law has always 
been statutory in origin. Congress enacted the first copyright statute in 
1790, in the exercise of its constitutional power to secure to authors such 
exclusive rights in their writings.60 Despite originating in a statute, 
however, U.S. copyright law has never been just a body of textual directives 
enacted by the legislature. Indeed, for the better part of its existence, U.S. 
copyright law was principally judge-made. 
The Copyright Act of 1790 was a barebones piece of legislation, 
modelled on the Statute of Anne.61 While it was periodically updated 
through the nineteenth century, the statute as such was seen to play some-
thing of a secondary role in the system. Courts were instead identified as 
entrusted with the task not just of interpreting the statute but also of 
developing the law further through reliance on first principles and 
deductive logic.62 This trend continued through most of the nineteenth 
century, evidenced most poignantly in the pages of the most influential 
copyright treatise of the era, published in 1879: Drone on Copyright.63 In 
describing his approach to the subject, the copyright treatise-writer Eaton 
Drone categorically ridiculed the deficiencies that characterized the 
copyright statutes, noting how it fell to courts to develop the law using 
“principles” that were “fundamental and general.”64 Courts were there-
                                                                                                                           
 58. Id. at 1522. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124. 
 61. See Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.). 
 62. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 87, 94–102 (2004) 
(“[F]or much of U.S. history, U.S. copyright law has limited itself to defining a relatively 
simple, industry-neutral property entitlement. The courts subsequently enforced and 
elaborated upon the entitlement in a common-law-like manner.”). 
 63. Eaton S. Drone, A Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual Productions in 
Great Britain and the United States Embracing Copyright in Works of Literature and Art, 
and Playright in Dramatic and Musical Compositions, at vi–vii (1879) (“[T]he whole body 
of the law of copyright is more or less affected by [judicial interpretations].”). 
 64. Id. at v, viii. 
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fore seen not just as interpreters of the statute, or as offering supplemen-
tary guidance on the topic, but instead as the regime’s effective lawgivers, 
despite the formal statutory origins of the area. 
Congress too—through its statutes—consciously acquiesced in this 
state of affairs. Each of the copyright statutes that it passed, all the way 
through 1909, was sparse and open-ended in structure, in the nature of 
what might be characterized as “common law statutes.”65 Despite the 
Copyright Act of 1909 being described as a “general revision” of the law,66 
Congress retained this institutional balance in the regime’s overall frame-
work. The first half of the twentieth century therefore saw federal courts 
continuing to develop much of what might be described as the nation’s 
copyright law. 
By the 1940s, this model—of sparsely worded copyright statutes and a 
greater reliance on courts to develop a common law of copyright—came 
to be criticized.67 The rapid arrival of new technologies of both copying 
and dissemination rendered courts’ bare reliance on the fundamental 
principles of the system somewhat incomplete and uncertain to many 
copyright scholars and lawyers. By the 1950s, a significant movement had 
begun for a new approach not just to copyright law but to copyright 
lawmaking.68 
Thus emerged the Copyright Act of 1976, the present statute in 
force.69 The Register of Copyright at the time described the regime that it 
encapsulated as representing “a shift in direction for the very philosophy” 
of U.S. copyright law.70 In a distinctive break with past copyright statutes, 
the 1976 Act aimed at comprehensiveness in coverage, with most of its 
provisions representing an elaborate compromise between different copy-
right industry groups, which Congress—under the guidance of the 
Copyright Office—enacted into law.71 Areas of copyright that had previ-
ously been created, developed, and synthesized entirely by courts were 
                                                                                                                           
 65. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1007, 1052 (1989). 
 66. Thorvald Solberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35 Yale L.J. 48, 61 (1925). 
 67. For the best-known criticism, describing the contradictory and confusing case law 
that emerged under the 1909 Act, see Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 
80–85 (1967). 
 68. See Copyright Off. of the Libr. of Cong., Study No. 1: The History of U.S.A. 
Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to 1954, at 1–14 (Comm. Print 1955), https://www.
copyright.gov/history/studies/study1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5L7-S52R] (Goldman, Abe 
A.) (detailing how amendments to and reforms of copyright law in the United States 
changed over the course of the first half of the twentieth century). 
 69. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–
810 (2018)). 
 70. Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 
477, 479 (1977). 
 71. For the leading account of this process, see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compro-
mise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 857, 860–79 (1987). 
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now given a textual significance, all in an effort to establish the institu-
tional primacy of Congress and legislation in the domain of copyright law. 
A fully intended consequence of this assertion of legislative 
supremacy in the area was a trenchant dismantling of the idea that courts 
were lawmakers. Courts were instead to be seen as mere interpreters of the 
law, except in the few areas where the legislation had actively delegated 
lawmaking authority to them in recognition of the fact that they had 
achieved some success in these areas pre-1976.72 As one prominent federal 
judge put it, the pervasive sentiment characterizing the new statute was 
one where “[c]ourts are regarded with suspicion.”73 
The myriad intellectual and sociopolitical influences that generated 
the new model underlying the 1976 Act need not detain us here. Suffice it 
to say that the 1976 Act consciously envisioned a reallocation of institu-
tional power within copyright law, one where the old common law style of 
rule development that had dominated the U.S. copyright landscape 
between 1790 and 1975 was to be replaced with a statutory model, replete 
with regulatory thinking and comprehensive textual guidance. With the 
emergence of textualism as a form of interpretation that is sensitive to the 
institutional balance of power, the reallocation of lawmaking authority 
attempted by the 1976 Act has only come to be further entrenched.74 
Closely aligned with the shift from courts to Congress was another 
equally important move that has since come to dominate copyright 
thinking and jurisprudence. And this is the shift in the mode of reasoning 
employed in copyright thinking; one that is best described as a move from 
principle to policy. Over the years, scholars have spent significant time 
examining the intricacies of the policy/principle divide.75 Distilled down 
to its basics, the distinction maps onto the difference between an internal 
and external focus. An argument based on policy looks to the goal or 
objective that the system is seeking to realize, and attempts to show how 
                                                                                                                           
 72. Prominent examples include the fair use doctrine in Section 107, and the 
requirement of originality, contained in Section 102(a). See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51, 
65 (1976). 
 73. Leval, supra note 11, at 1062. 
 74. An emergence that one prominent textualist describes as “second-generation 
textualism.” John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1287, 1289–
90 (2010) (describing how second-generation textualism is sensitive to the compromises 
involved in lawmaking and respects balances of power). 
 75. The leading account, which most of this scholarship traces itself back to, is that of 
Ronald Dworkin. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1058–59 (1975) 
[hereinafter Dworkin, Hard Cases] (distinguishing arguments of policy from arguments of 
principle by explaining how the former are predicated on the advancement of some 
collective interest, whereas the latter are concerned with securing some individual or group 
right). Dworkin’s account bears a distinct resemblance to the distinction between policy and 
principle first made by Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, the founders of the Legal 
Process school. See Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The 
Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 27 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 419–28 (1987). 
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something either furthers or impedes that objective.76 In contrast, an 
argument based on principle does not base itself on an external goal sought 
to be realized but instead on considerations that are internal to the system, 
such as morality, justice, fairness, or coherence.77 Principles are based on 
reasons and derive their validity therefrom, whereas policy goals realize 
their legitimacy by virtue of the structural authority of the goal-setter, i.e., 
by fiat. 
As should therefore be obvious from this characterization, arguments 
and claims based on policy are rooted in the notion of legislative 
supremacy—i.e., that the legislature has identified a goal for the system or 
law, and courts should interpret and apply the law in a way that best fur-
thers this goal. The rationality or wisdom of that goal is never called into 
question, except in relation to the Constitution. Claims of principle, 
however, derive their force from the persuasiveness with which they are 
elaborated on by courts. The policy/principle distinction thus adds an 
important substantive dimension to the institutional question of legisla-
ture versus courts. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 cemented the idea of copyright as a policy-
based regime, one where Congress sought to impose a unifying vision for 
the area of the law.78 The vision was hardly unitary—i.e., the Act embodied 
multiple policies—yet it existed and deserved deference. Courts thus fell 
into line, seeking to make their jurisprudence further that vision, in stark 
contrast to what they had been doing previously in their capacity as 
lawmakers. This preference for policy reached its pinnacle in the Court’s 
own decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft, which involved a constitutional 
challenge to a provision of the copyright statute.79 In upholding the provi-
sion, the Court expressly affirmed the idea that legislative supremacy was 
the dominant structural ideal behind U.S. copyright law, and that courts 
were to refrain from second-guessing Congress’s wisdom in setting policy 
goals in the area, even if such wisdom was not readily obvious on its face.80 
Congress over courts, and policy over principle. 
2. Reviving Juricentrism? — In a subtle but real way, the majority 
opinion in PRO challenges both these accepted dogmas. In its acceptance 
of the rule constitutive of the government edicts doctrine, the majority 
places very little reliance on the text of the statute or indeed on the 
doctrine’s compatibility with the text. To the extent that it invokes the 
                                                                                                                           
 76. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 75, at 1059. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1061 (“Policy decisions must therefore be made through the operation of 
some political process designed to produce an accurate expression of the different interests 
that should be taken into account.”). 
 79. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 80. Id. at 222 (“The wisdom of Congress’ action, however, is not within our province 
to second-guess.”). 
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statute, it is in recognition of the fact that the principle of authorship—
underlying the government edicts doctrine—has itself been incorporated 
into the statute. Indeed, it somewhat summarily rejects an argument that 
in not validating the doctrine—but instead creating a distinct one for U.S. 
government works—Congress had intended to reject the government 
edicts doctrine.81 
The majority’s decision to root the government edicts doctrine in the 
principle of authorship is equally consequential in this regard. While 
Congress may have used the term authorship in the statute, the idea of 
authorship remains altogether undefined.82 Over the history of copyright 
law, authorship has remained a contested area of copyright doctrine and 
most importantly, one that courts have had to develop on their own with 
no legislative intervention.83 While often squeezed between the copyright 
statute’s better-known protectability requirements—originality and fix-
ation84—authorship nevertheless rears its head periodically as a principled 
solution to innumerable copyright dilemmas.85 
To be sure, Chief Justice Roberts roots the government edicts 
doctrine in authorship but fails to specify how the two are related. All the 
same, in so relying on it he was making an unambiguous statement about 
the institutional legitimacy of the Court to decide the validity and scope of 
the doctrine. In other words, the very invocation of authorship might be 
seen as the majority’s laying claim to a form of statutory independence for 
its decision. And in so doing, it subverts the idea of congressional 
exclusivity in the domain with great subtlety. 
The opinion even makes this subversion obvious in its response to 
Georgia’s assertion that the government edicts doctrine being rooted in 
notions of “public policy” was fundamentally incompatible with the 
“‘modern era’ of statutory interpretation.”86 This is a direct allusion to the 
idea of congressional supremacy and the premise that courts are to 
interpret—rather than develop—the law. The majority dismisses this by 
                                                                                                                           
 81. PRO, 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1509–10 (2020). 
 82. The use of the term is seen in Section 102(a), where protection is afforded to 
“original works of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). 
 83. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1884) (“The 
question here presented [on what constitutes authorship] is one of first impression under 
our Constitution . . . .”). 
 84. The statute reads in relevant part that “[c]opyright protection subsists, in 
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added). The legislative history accompanying the 
provisions notes that originality and fixation are the “two fundamental criteria of copyright 
protection” but says almost nothing about authorship, despite noting that the phrase is left 
“undefined.” H.R. Rep. No 94-1476, at 51 (1976). 
 85. For an account of authorship, arguing for a requirement of authorial causation in 
copyright protection, see generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Causing Copyright, 117 
Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2017). 
 86. PRO, 140 S. Ct. at 1510. 
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again rooting the government edicts doctrine in authorship and noting 
how Congress had used the term without abrogating the doctrine; and 
then follows up with the observation that it is not altering the fundamental 
separation of powers insofar as Congress was always at liberty to amend the 
law to “correct” the Court’s mistakes.87 Unquestionably then, Chief Justice 
Roberts recognized his opinion to be running up against the accepted idea 
of what courts were to do in copyright. 
Of equal significance in the opinion is Chief Justice Roberts’s 
acceptance of the policy/principle divide and his recognition that the 
majority’s development of the law is heavily rooted in principle. At 
numerous points in the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts identifies author-
ship in copyright law as a principled mechanism, embodying its own 
internal (albeit unannounced) meaning.88 Perhaps most importantly 
though, he explicitly treats those principles of authorship as potentially 
antagonistic to the statute’s policy goals. As a last-ditch effort, Georgia 
argued that the Court’s acceptance of the government edicts doctrine was 
contrary to the copyright statute’s avowed policy of incentivizing the pro-
duction of creative works through the market, a widely accepted goal of 
the regime that the Court has itself endorsed on multiple occasions.89 The 
majority’s response to this argument is unequivocal: Take it elsewhere. Or 
as the opinion puts it: “[The] appeal to copyright policy, however, is 
addressed to the wrong forum.”90 Policy arguments were for Congress—
not courts—to consider; and the Court’s decision was to be based on prin-
ciple rather than policy. In thus setting up the conflict between principle 
and policy, and endorsing the former at the cost of the latter, the majority 
opinion could not have been clearer about its deviation from the accepted 
norms of judicial role in copyright adjudication. 
The dissenting opinion’s cautionary warnings are therefore no mere 
hyperbole. Instead, they reflect the reality that the majority opinion—
substance aside—is swimming against the tide of extreme judicial 
deference that has characterized U.S. copyright adjudication for the last 
half-century. Perhaps equally important, the dissent was responding to the 
subtlety and sophistication with which Chief Justice Roberts executed the 
subversion in the majority opinion. The question that then remains is 
whether this contrarian approach is normatively desirable and, if so, 
capable of extension into other domains of copyright. 
                                                                                                                           
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1503, 1512. 
 89. See id. at 1511. 
 90. Id. 
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III. THE JUDICIAL ROLE BEYOND GOVERNMENT EDICTS 
Modern copyright adjudication should be more than statutory 
interpretation, and yet it is not. Whether it is wooden textualism or a 
purposivist reliance on the legislative history of the copyright statute, 
federal courts—including the Supreme Court—have come to see their 
role as significantly diminished within the copyright system.91 While this 
approach places the separation of powers ideal at the forefront, it also 
severely constrains the ability of the copyright system to rationalize itself 
from within—as a body of law with an internal coherence and justification, 
beyond what the legislature in its political wisdom might have seen for it. 
Questions that are capable of being answered through logical deduction 
and analogical reasoning now require the fiction of a hook in the text or 
legislative history for their answers. Alternatively, such answers are taken 
to appear magically from the “plain meaning” of the text.92 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in PRO suggests that this 
need not be the only way for courts to approach copyright adjudication. 
Courts deciding copyright cases can—and perhaps should—also place 
greater emphasis on the value of what the legal philosopher Ronald 
Dworkin famously called “integrity” in adjudication.93 According to 
Dworkin, integrity entails judges deciding cases on the operative assump-
tion that the system of rights and duties at issue is part of a whole 
“expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness.”94 As an inter-
pretive exercise involves making the best sense of an existing practice as 
an expository matter, integrity thus elides the distinction between making 
and applying the law at the center of debates about judicial role.95 Rather 
than being disrespectful of the legislature within a statutory context, a 
commitment to integrity entails imputing to the legislature the belief 
(albeit as a fiction) that in drafting the statute the legislature too was 
driven by a commitment to the regime’s systemic coherence, rather than 
by pure political compromises.96 
Indeed, the majority opinion in PRO articulates precisely such a vision 
of integrity, insofar as it denies that it is making new law and at the same 
                                                                                                                           
 91. Compare Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017) 
(“We thus begin and end our inquiry with the text.”), with Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, 
Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 438–39 (2014) (“But when read in light of its purpose, the [Copyright] 
Act is unmistakable: An entity that engages in activities like Aereo’s performs.”). 
 92. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010. 
 93. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 176 (1986). 
 94. Id. at 225. 
 95. Id. at 225–26. Interpretivism is a critical feature of Dworkin’s theory, which of 
course informs his account of integrity. It entails constructing a practice or concept in the 
best light possible for it, in the process eliding the distinctions between a purely 
objective/neutral description and an openly reconstructionist prescription, otherwise 
known as the is/ought distinction. Id. at 46–56. 
 96. Id. at 337–50. 
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time extols how its reconstruction of the government edicts doctrine 
coheres with the grand vision underlying the copyright statute.97 What it 
thereby affirms is the reality that copyright law is built around a set of 
functional principles that make copyright law what it is, rather than just a 
legislative compromise in furtherance of an instrumental goal. And it 
credits Congress with acquiescing in these principles, even if not 
affirmatively endorsing them.98 In other words, this move naturalizes core 
aspects of copyright law to some extent liberating it from the political 
machinery. 
Recasting the judicial role in copyright as being about integrity there-
fore injects a rationality and normative coherence into the system, which 
contribute significantly to its legitimacy. Copyright has long suffered a 
legitimacy crisis of sorts,99 wherein the realpolitik surrounding its creation 
and modifications has inevitably led to a sense of incredulity in its very 
claim to existence. Writing at the turn of the twentieth century, Mark 
Twain famously remarked that “[o]nly one thing is impossible for God: to 
find any sense in any copyright law on the planet.”100 Adjudicative integrity 
offers a strong antidote to this cynicism. 
This, however, brings us to a more pragmatic concern. Even if the 
vision of judicial role implicit in the majority’s opinion in PRO is deemed 
normatively desirable, is it indeed capable of extension to other questions 
of copyright law or was it unique to the government edicts doctrine and its 
origins in historic precedent? The answer to this question is more nuanced 
than a simple yes or no. 
To be sure, the circumstances of the PRO case and the nature of the 
precedents at issue therein proved to be the perfect vehicle for an 
integrity-driven approach to copyright adjudication. All the same, that 
approach need hardly be limited to questions involving pre-statutory prec-
edents. Given that much of copyright law—even under the Act of 1976—
is built on concepts and doctrines that were in vogue long before the 
comprehensive revision, it is but reasonable to operate on the assumption 
that many (if not all) of these concepts embody an internal justification 
that transcends a purely instrumental belief that they were embedded into 
the copyright system for purely political reasons. Courts committed to 
                                                                                                                           
 97. See PRO, 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1506–11 (2020). 
 98. Id. at 1510. 
 99. It is a crisis in the sense of being seen by the public as lacking a valid reason for its 
existence, and as being significantly overextended beyond what is needed. See Pamela 
Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 740, 740 (2013) (reviewing 
Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud and Other Abuses of Intellectual Property Law (2011) and 
William Patry, How to Fix Copyright (2012)) (“Copyright law has taken quite a beating in 
the legal literature in the past decade or so.”). 
 100. Samuel Langhorne Clemens, Back in America (May 23, 1903), in Mark Twain’s 
Notebook 374, 381 (Albert Bigelow Paine ed., 1935). 
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integrity should strive to reason their way through that internal justifica-
tion rather than simply assume a superficial “policy” rationale for a rule 
or concept. A few examples will help illustrate the point. 
A.  The Exclusion of Facts 
Consider first the rule excluding facts from copyright protection. The 
rule itself finds no express mention in the copyright statute but derives 
from the statute’s denial of protection to “discoveries”;101 yet most courts 
and scholars take it as a fundamental rule of the copyright landscape that 
is “universally understood.”102 When called upon to determine its scope 
and applicability to a novel situation, a court might adopt one of two 
approaches. In the first, it could find the rule to be magically hidden in 
the language of the statute itself, and thereupon treat the rule as driven 
entirely by policy considerations that were imposed as a political matter on 
the law during its framing. Indeed, Judge Frank Easterbrook’s 1990 
decision in Nash v. CBS vividly illustrates this approach, wherein he 
expressly declared that the rule did “not come straight from first princi-
ples” but was instead entirely a congressional prerogative.103 To the 
contrary is an alternate approach, the outlines of which appear in the 
Court’s famed decision in Feist v. Rural Telephone Service Co.104 
In this latter approach, the rule is seen as emanating from copyright’s 
requirement of originality, as old as copyright itself.105 Originality on its 
own does not say much about the exclusion of facts, which begins to make 
sense if one understands originality as itself deriving from copyright’s 
commitment to authorship and the ideal that the author is the individual 
“to whom anything owes its origin.”106 Facts fail the originality require-
ment because they do not owe their origin to the putative author and 
instead have an epistemic existence independent of such individual. The 
exclusion is thus rooted in the principle of authorship, which will now 
allow a judge to make better sense of its extension and application to novel 
situations such as “created facts.”107 
                                                                                                                           
 101. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018). 
 102. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991). 
 103. Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1542–43 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 104. Indeed, one might argue that Feist foreshadows something of an integrity-driven 
approach to copyright adjudication, especially insofar as it based its reasoning on prece-
dents and their underlying principles. The opinion references “principle[s]” on innumer-
able occasions as well. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 347, 350–51, 354. 
 105. Id. at 345. 
 106. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). 
 107. See generally Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright 
Law, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 43 (2007) (describing copyright’s treatment of created—i.e., 
fictional—facts). 
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B.  Delineating the “Work” 
It should matter little to a court committed to integrity that a concept 
or idea finds mention in the text of the statute, unless the historical record 
reveals that Congress chose to alter the principled construction of that 
concept.108 Sometimes the legislative history will reveal that Congress 
chose to retain prior interpretations of a term (e.g., originality), providing 
courts with a firmer footing on which to embark on a principled under-
standing.109 These are the easy cases. 
Yet, even when the legislative history is silent on the statute’s use of a 
term, but the term relates to other aspects of the system, integrity demands 
that courts derive a principled answer to understanding the term rather 
than superficially deferring to a presumptive or hidden policy concern 
that limits them to the plain meaning of the text. Paradigmatic of this 
category is the very idea of a “work,” which forms the unit of protection 
for copyright law and which the statute repeatedly references, but without 
defining in any way or form.110 
One approach, an institutionally minded textualist one, would have a 
court note the absence of any legislative history on the concept and then 
rely on the plain meaning of the term, which does little more than enable 
a plaintiff-author to unilaterally determine when to deem expressive con-
tent a “work” for the purposes of registration and/or an infringement 
action.111 In this approach, the court might simply throw up its hands and 
defer to the Copyright Office’s approach to registering works, in the belief 
that since it routinely administers the statute’s conception of a work, it is 
best positioned to delineate it. 
An alternative integrity-focused one would instead attempt to situate 
the idea of a work around the system’s internal reasons for the term’s exist-
ence. Since its inception, copyright law has always had a unit of protection.112 
That unit of protection was delineated not merely for administrative 
convenience (i.e., registration) but on the assumption that the law’s meas-
ure of authorial contribution—origination—was sufficiently robust to 
                                                                                                                           
 108. This is often converted into a canon of statutory interpretation known as common 
law conformity. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) (“Statutes which 
invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of 
long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is 
evident.”). 
 109. An obvious example here is the doctrine of originality. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 
at 51 (1976) (“[The statute] incorporate[s] without change the standard of originality 
established by the courts under the present copyright statute.”). 
 110. For an excellent account of this problem, see generally Paul Goldstein, What Is a 
Copyrighted Work? Why Does It Matter?, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1175 (2011). 
 111. Id. at 1176 (“The reflexive answer to the question . . . is that the work is whatever 
the author says it is.”). 
 112. The Copyright Act of 1790 identified this unit as maps, charts, or books. Copyright 
Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124. 
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extend to the entire unit. In other words, the work was one of the law’s 
indirect mechanisms for determining the existence of authorship and thus 
took color from it. 
Is the chapter of a book the work, or is it instead the book as a whole? 
In answering this in favor of the latter, copyright law historically reasoned 
that authorial contribution was to be understood in the aggregate for copy-
rightability purposes. Indeed, it is this logic that fully explains why in the 
landmark case of Baker v. Selden, the Court found the plaintiff’s work to be 
copyrightable even though it observed that blank forms—which consti-
tuted some part of the plaintiff’s work—were ineligible for protection on 
their own.113 In other words, much like with both government edicts and 
the exclusion of facts, it is explained by copyright’s principle of authorship 
and the idea that the author’s causal contribution to the work defines its 
boundaries. A court attempting to delineate the work for the purposes of 
protection should therefore be driven by its relationship to authorship and 
the idea of authorial contribution that is implicit in the notion of a “work 
of authorship.”114 
CONCLUSION 
The PRO decision is undoubtedly important for its substantive 
holding on the government edicts doctrine and will come to be remem-
bered for bringing the doctrine into the modern era. It will also be 
remembered for furthering free public access to laws, critical to notions of 
due process and the rule of law. All the same, lurking underneath the 
majority’s substantive contributions is an equally important structural 
move, one with potential ramifications that go well beyond the govern-
ment edicts doctrine. 
In reasserting the role of courts as the guardians of reason and prin-
ciple within the copyright system despite the comprehensiveness and 
primacy of the statute, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion should be seen as 
speaking not just for the majority of the Court but for all of the federal 
judiciary. Adjudicative integrity, which the opinion foreshadows as a virtue 
in copyright decisionmaking, would go a long way in resurrecting the 
notion that the copyright system was and is much more than a product of 
content industry realpolitik and lobbying. The modern approach, which 
presents courts with a faux choice between extralegal policy considera-
tions and the letter of the law, does little justice to the nuance of the 
copyright system and its evolution over time. Copyright law embodies a 
deep internal coherence and rationality that is all too easily forgotten by 
courts and scholars, given their exclusive emphasis on the text and history 
                                                                                                                           
 113. 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (“The conclusion . . . is[] that blank account-books are not 
the subject of copyright; and that the mere copyright of Selden’s book did not confer upon 
him the exclusive right to make and use account-books, ruled and arranged as designated 
by him and described and illustrated in said book.”). 
 114. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). 
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of the statute—both of which capture only parts of that edifice. The PRO 
opinion empowers courts to find and illuminate that rationality, a task 
which should come naturally to them. 
